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The Constitutional Aspects of Home Rule

by
HENRY

FLOYD
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Perhaps what we should do is trace the history of the constitutional
concept of home rule in South Carolina and then get around to the most
important thing: what questions we have to deal with.
Initially, I think home rule is nothing new to South Carolina which
might surprise some of you. In fact the constitution of 1868 contained
a provision that was taken from the Ohio constitution that provided as
follows: "The qualified electors of each county shall elect three persons
for the term of two years who - shall have jurisdiction over roads,
highways, ferries, bridges, and in all matters relating to taxes, disbursement of money for county purposes and in every other case that
may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concern to the
respective counties."
Now you can see that's quite a broad provision and very progressive
and ahead of its time for 1868, and unfortunately, that provision, as I
said being ahead of its time, became one of the focal points of the
power struggle between the so-called carpetbaggers in the late 1800's
and the white democrats. That struggle conswnated in a repeal of
that particular provision in the 1890's. In fact, county government for
all practical purposes was left out of the 1895 constitution in terms of
how it would be constructed or what forms there would be. Now there
are some provisions in other parts that we'll discuss later, but basically
it was just ignored.
The general law carryovers of the board of commissioners and the
roads and bridges jurisdiction of county government was maintained
in Article X, Section 6 of the constitution. As I said, the provision
was repealed and left out of the constitution of 1895 and subsequently
the power to run both state government and county government was
placed in the general assembly and for some 80 odd years now it's been
run for all practical purposes out of Columbia, which, in my own
personal opinion is contrary to the concept of home rule and it does not
best meet the needs of the people. This particular attitude of having
county government run from the state house rather than the court house
0
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was carefully guarded by the judiciary in interpreting a number of
decisions in which they treated county government as an arm of state
government. And the court house for all practical purposes, became
merely a place of record keeping, with an occasional visitati on from
the circuit court. There were some confrontations between local officeholders, county auditors, etc., but the real power to run local government was in the state house in the supply bill.
Now South Carolina took its own good time leaving the 19th
century. The counties were virtually ignored in the 1895 constitu tion,
and the taxing power, which is the real power of government, was left
with the legislature.
The fellow that drafted Article X, Section 6 was really an unimaginative fellow when he drafted the so-called county purpose doctrine , because even that particular concept limited the individual legislator or the delegation severely in how to deal budgetarily with county
government. You may be familiar with that provision but generally it
provides just for the maintenance of roads and bridges , the burial of
paupers and a few other very restricted kinds of things. The county
government couldn 't deal in water districts or sewer systems or fire
protection or a number of other things that have become almost necessary in today 's society. To get around Article X, Section 6, some of
our people contrived the idea of the special purpose district which 111
address myself to in just a minute.
But there became increasingly from 1895 a recognition by a num ber
of people that this kind of government was not in the best interes t
of the local people. And I suppose we should pay tribute to the holy
city of Charleston and the county of Charleston because in the late 1940's
they initiated the first County Coun cil Act. It was challenged in a
cowt decision in 1948 and survived for all practical purposes the constitutional questions with some exceptions. Any constitutional question
that was rais ed by the county council act, 1948, and all those thereafter ,
I think, have been resolved by th e pa ssage of the new Article VIII.
Now as I said just a minute ago, to get around the problems of
Article X, Section 6, the counties began to develop a form of govern ment called Government By Special Purpose Districts. The countie s
couldn't do certain things but somebody in the legislature used their
imagin ation and decided that setting up a special purpose district within
the county would get around the constitutional provision, and that is
exactly what happened. Now we have some 200 or more of these particular kinds of districts in South Carolina. The special purpose district
was a good innovation for two or three reasons. One, it showed a
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little imagination, to overcome the constitutional provisions. Second,
it met a specific need in -the area, for example, for fire protection
for a particular area, or for water service or sewer service. On the
other hand, their proliferation was something akin to rabbits, there are
just too many of them. And the ultimate effect of special purpose
districts was that they began to strangle not only municipal government but county government. So we had to take a look at that in view
of what it was doing to those bodies of government that were dually
constituted to run local affairs, and that was one of the reasons behind Article VIII.
The break finally came in terms of getting local government back
in the hands of the people as a result of reapportionment. The battles
of 1960, and those that continue even today will ultimately end, I hope,
in the reapportionment of the senate. The legislative delegation is no
longer capable of managing local affairs, not only from a legal and
fairness standpoint, but particularly from a time aspect because the responsibility of a legislature has become almost full-time in Columbia .
In the late 1960's there was developed a constitutional revision
study committee and they proposed the now enacted Article VIII. The
people voted on it in 1972 and belatedly the General Assembly enacted
this particular implementing legislation in 1975. Thus there began
constitutionally a local government renaissance which had been originally born in 1868 but now reborn again in 1975.
The court test to the new constitutional Article VIII came very quickly in the case of Knight vs. Salisbury. Lronically, the object of that particular court suit was a special purpose district. These things are going
to cause us trouble. Let me point out one of the problems. In the
home rule bill there is talk about special purpose districts and how you
dissolve them and how you maintain them and what you do with them.
There is also a 1974 act on the books that talks about the vecy same
thing and gives a great deal of power to county governing bodies to
expand, restrict or actually abolish special purpose districts. But there
is a conflict in the language between how you go about doing it. So
we have some problems there and they are going to continue to be a
thorn in our side.
The unfortunate thing about Knight vs. Salisbury was that the
Supreme Court was not unanimous. The vote was something like a
basketball defense 1-2-2, although it was a 3-2 majority. The opinion
of the court written by Judge Littlejohn was concurred in by Justice
Lewis and Justice Moss, but they reached their decision through a
completely different avenue. Then you had Judge Butsey and Judge
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Brailsford on the other hand in the dissent so that it didn't really provide us with a lot except that it scared us to death. We though t we
better hurry up and get this act passed. So it took about two years
for us to get around to doing that.
During the debate on home rule the latter part of this year, came
the Horry County decision. It involves several questions . One is the
constitutionality of the supply bill, based on the fact th at the Horry
delegation was partly composed of people outside Horry County. One
member lived in Georg etown County and that was a result of the <reapportionment problem again. Judge Larson issued a very detailed order
in which he struck down the supply bill, but by the time it got to the
Supreme Court they decided not to rule on the point because it was
already moot. So we don't have any real clear cut decisions to this
date on the question of suppl y bills. Judge Morrison's order is still in
effect. The Supreme Court did not :reverse that decision, they just
chose not to hear it.
Now that's the history. I would like to change gears and prop ose
several questions fm you. A lot of it is going to need litigation. Some
of it is going to need corrective litigation, and some of it's just
going to need a good election next year to clear it up, but the questi ons
are going to be the same.
First of all, what did Amcle VIII do to the 1895 constitution? It
repealed old Article VII which was an article dealing with county government ( specifically with the merger and consolidation and disillusion
of counties). By constitutional interpretation, I think the latter will of
the people overrides the first , but nevertheless it is still there and
it could cause some problems in terms of some of the provisions that
are in there . For example, the eight mile courthouse limit is still on
tl1e book. So what happens as a result of that? I don't know.
What do we do about the general law already on the books dealing
with the merger of counties , when it says in Article VIII that the General
Assembly shall provide, and we haven't? Under the preliminary power
of the legislature, probably that general law is still good, but there is
a question about that. In repealing old Article VIII here is a very interes ting question for the municipal people . In Section 7 of old Article VIII
there was an 8% debt ceiling limitation. That same limitation can be
found in Amcle X, Section 5. But the Knight vs. Salisbury case and
other cases, in terms of constructing constitution, says that any old
Article must be harmonized and construed in light of the last will of
the people - which is new Article VIII. Now does that mean that the
8% debt limitation does not apply to municipalities, notwithstandin g
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that the provision is still in the constitution in Artcle X? So there's
a constitutional problem. And that's a serious problem in terms of the
impact of the financial structure of municipalities in particular. The
county provision is still in Article X.
Another question. What do you do about Article III, Section 34 and
its impact on Article VIII? That particular section is the local act, or
special act, prohibition. The general assembly and the courts have
winked at this thing from time immemorial. That is the way we run
things, by local act. There are a number of laws on the books that
are nothing but special acts and local acts and in my opinion unconstitutional and subject to challenge. This is going to be one of the
critical problems in the future. The Supreme Court is going to have
to come down very clearly and very hard on the question of local acts .
What are the provisions that are in the actual bill? Everywhere that
it says "the General Assembly shall provide for" somet):ring that can
reasonably be interpreted to be a power of the local governing bodies,
there is a constitutional cloud. For example, in selecting the terms of
office, 2 or 4 years (both in the county provision), to actually draw the
district lines if you choose to go the single member districts, to select
the number of members on the council, all this is provided in "the
General Assembly shall provide for this." Thank goodness the petition
method is in there so that if the will of the people is abrogated by
action of legislative members, then they can overcome that. But all
those things raise constitutional questions and we argued about it and
argued about it in the General Assembly, but we still passed it anyway.
Now what about some other constitutional questions that need to
be considered? Article V provides for a uniform judicial system . Yet
the legislature provided for municipal courts in the implementing legislation to Article VIII. So we've got a problem there.
One of the big questions for municipal people is the question of
annexation. Municipalities wanted to maintain the right to choose the
electric supplier in their area in case of annexation. The private power
companies agreed because they have control over most of the municipal
areas. The cooperatives, on the other hand, said no, we want to maintain the areas that have been assigned to us by the public service commission. There is a serious questji.on of annexation in terms of the
franchising rights of municipalities. And apparently it will have to be
litigated. We have spent two yea•rs trying to argue this thing out
and iron it out in conference committees and could not. There is a
division between the house and the senate over that matter. And so
apparently it will have to be litigated. How far does municipal franchise
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right go in light of Article VIII? Some say it goes all the way. Oth ers say
that provisions have taken exception to that. Others say th at the
General Assembly can provide for conditions and requirements of annexation, and so therefore can decide who's going to serve in the area.
And as I said, that's a big problem.
The last thing I think I would like to address myself to is education.
We have a lot of talk about education. What effect does home rule
have on education? Now we can argue about this but in my opinion
if you'll read Article XI, Section 3, it says the General Assembly shall
provide for a three system public education. That is a newly enacted
provision in the constitution. I take that to mean that the General
Assembly will provide for the educational system in this stat e and it
has nothing to do with home rule. But school board people hav e gone
out and advocated, we want home rule too. Maybe they ough t to
have it, but it doesn't belong in Aiticle VIII. It doesn't belong in this
implementing legislation. In my personal opinion it is subjec t to Article XI, Section 3 and if the General Assembly decides that home rule
for school districts is in their best interests then that's the way it
ought to be. But its not a part of this discussion - there is no mention
of education in Article VIII, it is in Article XI.
Finally, on the question of the constitutional aspects, there are two
articles that greatly affect home rule that are still outstanding, but have
not been submitted to the people. One is Article III, the legislative
article, and the other is Ai-tide X which is the finance article. If we
give you all these powers and we don't give you the financial wherewithall to do it, and at the same time provide safe-guards ( make sure
that the state's credit is not damaged) then we're going to have a
serious problem. Article X is old and it needs to be looked at not
only in terms of protecting the people from municipal and county
governments who choose not to balance their budgets and spen d unwisely, but also in terms of providing local governments with the
ability to meet those nee ds that are demanded by the people .

